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Case No. 20150398-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
ALEX L. LAMBROSE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his sentence for aggravated robbery, a first 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)G) (West Supp. 2012)(pour-over provision). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant and his brother stole a Cadillac from its owner at knife-
point. At the time, Defendant was a probationer who had absconded from 
supervision. 
Was it an abuse of discretion to give Defendant prison instead of probation? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
Gabriel Gomez listed his 2007 Cadillac for sale in November 2014. 
R82:11 (Add. B). Defendant, his brother Timothy Lambrose, and someone 
else arrived at Gomez's house in a white Nissan Titan to check it out. Id. 
Mr. Gomez agreed to go with Defendant on a test drive of the Cadillac. Id. 
Defendant drove for a while, but then pulled over after telling Mr. 
Gomez that the police were following them. Id. Mr. Gomez turned to see 
instead the white Nissan Titan behind them. R82:11-12. 
Defendant unlocked the Cadillac and Defendant's brother hopped 
out of the Nissan and into the backseat, wielding a bayonet-looking knife, 
with an eight- to ten-inch blade. R82:12. The brother began "punching" 
and ordering Mr. Gomez out of the car. Id. Mr. Gomez tried to pull out his 
own "little pocket knife," but he could not get it open and was ultimately 
forced out of his car. Id. 
1Because Defendant pleaded guilty, the facts are taken from the 
factual basis proffered at the plea hearing and in his written plea statement 
and from his pre-sentence investigation report (PSI). A copy of the plea 
hearing transcript is in Addendum B. 
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Defendant and his brother sped off in the Cadillac with the Nissan 
Titan following. Id. 
Mr. Gomez identified both Defendant and his brother from separate 
photo arrays. R51 (PSI). The Cadillac was eventually found in Defendant's 
father's driveway, with the keys in the Nissan Titan.2 R51. The Cadillac 
had been wrecked and was undriveable. R82:13; R51. 
Both Defendant and his brother initially denied any involvement in 
the robbery, but later jailhouse phone recordings found the two plotting to 
concoct an alibi for Defendant and to let the brother take the fall for the 
robbery. R51;R82:12-13. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Guilty plea. Defendant and his brother were both charged with 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. Rl; R82:4. Defendant pleaded 
guilty to the charge and the prosecution agreed to not refer the case to 
federal prosecutors and to remain silent at sentencing. R36; R82:5-6. 
PSI report. AP&P recommended prison. Although AP&P called 
Defendant's juvenile and adult criminal history "moderate," his criminal 
history score placed him well within a recommended prison sentence on the 
sentencing matrix. R49, 50, 55. 
2Defendant's brother told police that he had rented the white Nissan 
truck from a friend who later reported it stolen. R51. 
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Defendant's juvenile record began at age 11 and ended at 18. See R49, 
52-53. His juvenile offenses were all class B misdemeanors, ranging from 
destruction of property, shoplifting, assault, and possession of 
paraphernalia. R52. 
His adult record began in 2013, at age 22, and includes possession of 
stolen property, forgery, burglary, and possession of a controlled substance. 
R53. In April 2014, Defendant was placed on probation in two separate 
cases, one for third-degree felony forgery, the other for misdemeanor 
possession of a controlled substance. R53. He II absconded" from 
supervision and within seven months committed new crimes, including 
possession of a controlled substance and the aggravated robbery. R53. 
Defendant reported that he began using methamphetamines at age 13 
and marijuana at age 14. R54. Defendant had never been in treatment for 
substance abuse, 11 although" - as the PSI put it- ~'he was given the 
opportunity for it while on probation." R54. 
Defendant's letter. While awaiting sentencing on this case, Defendant 
wrote a letter to the court reporting that he had used his time in jail well: 
although he had no children, he had completed a parenting course, an 
addiction recovery class, and a life skills program; he had also attended 
some anger management classes. R46; R53. Defendant expressed his 
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commitment to being a "better man" and to leaving "this so called life 
behind." R47. 
Victim statement. The victim submitted a written statement to the 
court, asking that Defendant get "the maximum prison time." R19. He also 
asked for restitution and an order restraining Defendant from ever coming 
to his house again. Id. The victim expressed concern for his and his family's 
physical and emotional safety "because if they don't get convicted we will 
be fearing for our life." Id. 
Sentencing hearing. The sentencing court began the hearing with 
announcing that it had read both the PSI and Defendant's letter. R83:3. 
Defense counsel asked for probation. He emphasized that 
Defendant's "moderate" criminal history was mostly drug-related. R83:3. 
He talked about Defendant's accomplishments in jail, such as completing 
the parenting program and the L.D.S. Addiction Recovery program. R83:4. 
Counsel acknowledged the seriousness of the charged crime and that a first 
degree felony made it "more difficult to place someone on probation." Id. 
But counsel still asked the court to deviate from the prison recommendation 
and to place Defendant on" zero tolerance probation" so that he could try to 
"correct course" and get treatment for his drug problem. Id. 
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Defendant had nothing to add, other than he just wanted "to get on 
with" his life and to "[I]eave this behind" him. Id. 
True to his promise, the prosecutor remained silent on sentencing. 
R83:4-5. 
The trial court praised Defendant's letter as "well done," and hoped 
that Defendant would "continue on doing good things." R83:5-6. 
"Unfortunately, though," the court did not "think this is a case for 
probation because of the violent nature of the offense." R83:6. The court 
thus followed AP&P's recommendation and sentenced Defendant to the 
statutory prison term of five years to life, to run concurrently with any other 
sentence that Defendant might be serving. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed his sentence. R62, 68. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when it gave 
Defendant prison instead of probation. Defendant committed the 
aggravated robbery in this case while he was on probation in two separate 
cases. Indeed, Defendant had absconded from his supervised probation. 
Given the violent nature of the crime, Defendant's active participation in it, 
and his previous failure at probation, the sentencing court could reasonably 
conclude that Defendant was not a good candidate for continuing on 
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probation. Certainly, it cannot be said that no reasonable sentencer would 
have taken the view adopted by the trial court here. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS FULLY WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO PRISON 
INSTEAD OF PROBATION 
Defendant asserts that the sentencing court abused its discretion in 
sending him to prison "when his crime was committed when he was high 
on narcotics, when he was not the violent offender and when he had never 
been through serious drug treatment." Br. Aplt. 5. Essentially, Defendant 
complains that the sentencing court placed too much weight on the violent 
nature of his crime and not enough on his need for drug treatment. See 
generally Br. Aplt. 6-11. 
Sentencing courts traditionally have "wide latitude and discretion in 
sentencing.'~ State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997). A sentence 
will not be overturned "unless it exceeds statutory or constitutional limits, 
the judge failed to consider all the legally relevant factors, or the actions of 
the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitut~ abuse of discretion." 
State v. Sotolongo, 2003 UT App 214, ~3, 73 P.3d 991 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ,IS, 40 P.3d 
626; State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991). A sentencing 
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court abuses its discretion only when "no reasonable [person] would take 
the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, 
~14, 82 P.3d 1167 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); accord State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ~12, 84 P.3d 
854. 
A court's sentencing discretion is at its broadest when deciding 
whether to grant probation. This is because /If granting or withholding'" 
probation involves balancing '" intangibles of character, personality and 
attitude, of which the cold record gives little inkling."' Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 
1049 (quoting State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957)). Thus, "whether 
to grant probation is within the complete discretion of the trial court." Id. A 
reviewing court may overturn the denial of probation only when it is '"clear 
that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse 
·of discretion."' Id. (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,887 (Utah 1978)). 
A sentencing court does not abuse its discretion merely because it 
views a defendant's situation differently than the defendant does. Helms, 
2002 UT 12, if14. Yet that is the crux of Defendant's complaint here. 
Defendant does not contend that his sentence exceeds statutory or 
constitutional limits. He complains only that the sentencing court placed 
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too much emphasis on the violent nature of his crime, while giving 
insufficient weight to his need for drug treatment. Br. Aplt. 6-10. 
But choosing which factors matter most in sentencing is entirely 
within the sentencer' s discretion. See State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 
1990) (trial courts have discretion in weighing minimum-mandatory 
sentences because "one factor in mitigation or aggravation may weigh more 
than several factors on the opposite scale"); see also Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 1049 
(recognizing that "subtleties" of sentencing are often not apparent on "face 
of a cold record"). Here, the sentencing court found that the violent nature 
of the crime outweighed Defendant's late bid for one more chance at drug 
treatment outside prison. 
On this record, there was nothing "inherently unfair" about that call. 
When Defendant committed this violent crime, he was already on probation 
in two separate cases. He quickly violated his probation by absconding 
from supervision and then c01nmitting new crimes-some just two weeks 
before this one. The sentencing court could have reasonably concluded that 
Defendant's criminal behavior was escalating and that he was not a good 
candidate for continuing on probation. 
Defendant downplays his role in the robbery, asserting that it was his 
knife-wielding brother, not he, "who engaged in the act of violence." Br. 
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Aplt. 9. But if Defendant means that he should have gotten probation 
because he was less culpable than his brother, he never argued that below. 
He instead chose to acknowledge that his crime was the "-most serious" of 
his criminal career to date and that he was earnestly trying to "correct 
course." R83:3-4; R46-48. 
And contrary to his new argument, Defendant was every bit as 
culpable as his brother. While Defendant may not have wielded the knife, it 
was only his intentional conduct that made it possible for his brother to do 
so. Defendant therefore has not shown that no reasonable jurist would not 
have placed the same weight on the nature of the crime as the sentencing 
court did here. See Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, ,114. 
Nor was the sentencing court here obliged to give Defendant 
probation based only on his perceived need for drug treahnent. See State v. 
Do, 2015 UT App 147, ,17 (sentencing court did not abuse discretion in 
failing to "treat Do' s drug addiction solely as a mitigating factor"). In 
arguing otherwise, Defendant cites several academic articles and the fact 
that the Legislature has recently reduced the penalties for drug offenses. Br. 
Aplt. ,6-11. Significantly, Defendant never cited these articles to the 
sentencing court. See Do, 2015 UT App 147, fjf7 (noting Do's failure to cite to 
sentencing court the articles that he relied on in his appeal). And while the 
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Legislature has reduced the penalties for drug offenses, it has not reduced 
the penalty for aggravated robbery, the crime for which Defendant was 
sentenced. 
More importantly, Defendant overlooks that he had the opportunity 
to get treatment for his drug addiction while he was on probation. See R53. 
He squandered that opportunity when he absconded from supervision and 
committed new crimes. He thus cannot show that sentencing him to prison 
instead of probation was an unreasonable choice. 
In sum, Defendant has not shown that no reasonable person would 
agree with the sentencing decision in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has not shown that no reasonable sentencer would have 
given him prison instead of probation. His sentence therefore must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted on October 16, 2015. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
r-LA RAB. DUPAIX 
A sistant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
Sentencing Hearing Transcript 
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Case No . 141902453 
SENTENCING 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 7:n day of April , 
2015 , commenci ng ac che hour of 10 : Si a . m., t he above- entitled 
matter came o n for hearing before the HONORABLE SCOTT M. 
HADLEY , sitting as Judge i n the above - named Court for the 
pu r p ose of this cause a nd that the following p r oceedings were 
had . 
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P R O C E E D T N G S 
(:ranscriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
MR. GAGE: Alex Lambrose. 
THE COURT: Okay. State of Utah vs. Alex L. 
Lambrose, Case No. 141902453. Time set for AP & P 
sentencing. 
Okay. Mr. Lambrose is present. I've read through 
the pre-sentence and I had a nice letter, frankly, from Mr. 
Larr~rose, which I've also read. 
Any legal reason why we cannot proceed with 
sentencing? 
MR. BOUWHu:s: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you. We received a copy of the 
report and reviewed it. The report indicates that he has a 
moderate adult and juvenile criminal history, most of the 
crimes being drug-related. I noticed that there were some 
forgeries on his adult record, among some others, particularly 
this--obviously this--this crime here for which he's being 
sentenced today is--is the most serious and we recognize it is 
a serious crime. 
~e's got a couple of certificates that he completed 
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12 
13 
14 
l5 
16 
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i9 
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21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
whi:e he was jail, so he wasn't just sitting around; completed 
a Pare~ting with Love and Logic, that's dated February 3~rl of 
this year, and also completed the L.D.S. Addiction Recovery 
program, completed February 27t~ of this year. 
This sentence does not carry a minimum-mandatory. 
We recognize that with a first-degree felony, you know, it--it 
is more difficult to place someone on probation. We are 
asking the Court to consider deviating from the 
recommendation, after an appropriate period of time, placing 
him on a zero tolerance probation, allowing him a chance to 
try and correct course. 
He does have a--he has a drug history, he's got to 
take care of that one way or the other and we're asking the 
Court to give him a chance to do that, through probation. 
?HE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Mr. Lambrose, anything you would like to say b~fore 
sentence is imposed? 
MR. LAMBROSE: No, your Honor. I just want to get 
on with my life. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. LAMBROSE: Leave this behind me. 
THE COURT: Mr. Arnold? 
MR. ARNOLD: I've agreed to remain silent in 
·exchange for his plea. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. ARNOLD: :he restitution figures, we would just 
request a review of that. I--! know that the victim impact 
statement that has been submitted to the Court, that actually 
encapsulated the entire amount of the vehicle because it 
hadn't been :ocaced at that time. The vehicle has been 
located, but there was damage to it and--and so we just need 
to get a new figure for the Court. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do we need to set it for a 
hearing or can we just--
MR. ARNOLD: Let's set it for a review. 
THE COURT: --leave it open? 
MR. ARNOLD: I think that we have most of the 
documentation that we can provide to counsel and to Mr. 
Lambrose, through counsel, in regard to a figure. 
THE COURT: And then how much time do you need? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: How long before you get that to me? 
MR. ARNOLD: Give me 30 days. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: We probably ought to set a review out 
60 days, 'cause I'll need to get it to him. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. 
Mr. Lambrose, then, I'll do the following in 
connection with your conviction of a first-degree felony. I 
do appreciate both your letter, which I thought was very well 
done, I see a lot of letters and yours was well done, and I 
appreciate that you spent your time well while you're in 
5 
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® 
2 
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1 ., 
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custody and: hope you'll con~inue to do it. Unfo~tunately, 
though, ~--I just don't think this is a case for probation 
because of the violent nature of the offense, so I am 
following the recommendation, but I hope you'll continue on 
dqing good things that you've been doing in the--in the recent 
months. 
So it will be the sentence of this Court in 
connection with your conviction of a first-degree felony, 
aggravated robbery, that you be sentenced as follows: 
That you be sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 
one indeterminate term of five years to life. You may have 
credit for all of the time that you have served. 
And you are to pay restitution, if any, in an amount 
to be determined. And we'll set this for review of 
restitution on June 16::.~ at 9:00. 
And that is to run concurrent with any other 
sentence that you may be serving. Okay. 
Thank you, Mr. Lambrose. We'll see you back here on 
June l 6~h, then. 
MR. GAGE: Thank you, your Honor. 
{Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.} 
* * * 
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P R O C E E D i N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE CLERK: State of Utah vs. Alex L. Lambrose, Case 
No. 141902453 on for a preliminary hearing, State of Utah vs. 
Timothy Lambrose, Case No. 141901635 for sentencing and case 
ending in 2452 (inaudible) preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay. Good morning, everybody. Let's 
see, we have attorney Gage Arnold appearing on behalf of the 
State on all three cases and we have, let's see, attorney 
Logan Bushell appearing on behalf of and with, I'm assuming, 
Timo~hy Lambrose. Is that you, sir? 
MR. BUSHELL: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. And that's on Cases 1635 and 
2452. 
And then we have attorney--wait, did I get that 
wrong--we have attorney Michael Bouwhuis appearing on behalf 
of and with Alex Lambrose; correct? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. And you'll have to educate 
me as to where we're at. I've got a statement of--of--in ad--
of defendant in advance of plea here as well. So, where are 
we at? 
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MR. BCCWH~!S: Yes, Judge. ~r:less things have 
changed, _ understand that there will be a waiver on the--the 
a~~ravated robbery case on both of the defendant's parts, Ti~ 
Larrbrose and also Alex Lambrose. We--we do not have a 
reso:ution on Timothy Lambrose's aggravated robbery case, but 
: understand that we have a resolution for Alex Lambrose's 
part of that. 
THE COURT: Okay. And then--
MR. BOUWHUIS: And then on the third case, we 
ar:ticipa~e that prelim being held. 
THE COURT: Correct. Okay. On the second-degree 
fe.:..ony theft? 
Iv1R • BOCWH lJ IS : Yes, J,.1dge. 
TEE COURT: Okay. Okay. So then should we proceed 
-~ :aK1ng ~he waivers first? _s that the easies~ way? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I think so if that's--if that's okay. 
TEE COURT: Okay. Why don't we start with Timothy 
Lambrose then. Let me start with your waiver of your right to 
a preliminary hearing on case e~ding 2452, that's the first-
degree felony, aggravated robbery. 
MR. BUSHELL: It is, your Hc~or. 
TEE COURT: Is that your understanding, Mr. 
Lambrose? You're going to waive your right to a preliminary 
hearing on that case? 
fviR. 7:::MO':'HY LAMBROSE: Yes, 1t is, your Ho:-ior. 
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THE CO~RT: Okay. And have you gone over that right 
with your attorney? 
MR. TIMOTHY LAMBROSE: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: And do you feel like you understand that 
right? 
MR. TIMOTHY LAMBROSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And is it true you 1 re waiving that right 
at this time? 
MR. TIMOTHY LAMBROSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that as your waiver 
of your right to a preliminary hearing on case ending 2452. 
Then the other case I have with you, Mr. Timothy 
Lambrose, you're going forward with the preliminary hearing 
here today; correct? 
MR. TIMOTHY LAMBROSE: Yes, y~ur Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
And then turning to you, Mr. Alex Lambrose, on case. 
ending 2453, looks like you're going to waive your right to a 
preliminary hearing on that case and is that one being pled as 
well? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And--and Mr. Bouwhuis, what are 
the terms of the agreement then? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, the State has agreed not 
to refer that case to the Federal Government and also they've 
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agreed to remain silent in sentencing. 
THE COURT: Okay. But other than that, it's 
pleading then as charged; correct? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Excuse me. Okay. 
·Mr.Alex Lambrose then on that case, is that what 
you intend to do on that case? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, let's start with the 
preliminary hearing first. You understand on that case, you 
still have a right to a preliminary hearing? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And have you gone over that right with 
your attorney? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you feel like you understand that 
right? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And is it true you're waiving that right 
at this time? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that as your waiver 
of your right to a preliminary hearing. And then I'm told 
you're going to be pleading guilty to that charge, which is a 
first-degree felony, aggravated robbery; is that correct? 
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MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, you understand that a first-
degree felony is punishable by a maximum fine of up to $10,000 
and/or five years to :ife in the Utah State Prison? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And do you understand that ·could run 
consecutive to any other sentence? 
MR. ALEX LA.MBROSE: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you understand that even though 
there may be a recommendation that the punishment be less than 
that, I could ignore that recommendation and you could be 
sentenced up to that maximum? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Might be 20. 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any 
alcohol or drugs? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: No. 
THE COURT: Do you have any mental or physical 
condition that would impair your ability to understand these 
proceedings? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly then? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by pleading 
guilty, you would be admitting to each of the elements that 
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make up this offense? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And did you have a chance to read 
through this written plea agreement? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: Did you understand what you read? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that by signing it, 
you're telling me you do understand it and that you understand 
all of these rights and you're waiving these rights and that 
everything in this document is true? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And it looks like you've already signed 
it; is that correct? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And did you sign it with those things in 
mind that I've asked you about? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. I have. 
THE COURT: And did you sign it voluntarily? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Does the State have a factual 
basis then? 
MR. ARNOLD: Yes. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Before we do that--
MR. ARNOLD: Oh. Go ahead. 
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MR. BOUWHU:S: --just need a clarification. I wrote 
on there, it has been certainly, historically, that first-
degree felonies carry a--an u~timate maximum fine of $20,000. 
Did that change? 
THE COuRT: Oh. I see that on there. I'm not aware 
of the change, so I didn't know; in fact, I meant to ask if 
there's any mandatory minimum penalties. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: There are not, but I--it used to be 
that the second-degree felony carried a potential fine of ten 
thousand, the first-degree carried a potential fine of twenty. 
And--and I wrote twenty on there, I didn't--we didn't know if 
that had changed. 
THE COURT: Let me see if I can--
MR. BOUWHUIS: Obviously, that's not a fine that's 
ever been imposed, shor~iy no (inaudible) 
THE COURT: Do you--do you think there was a recent 
change? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I don't know. It used to be 
$20,000 and that's--so I don't know if that was changed. But 
you stated on the record that it was 10,000. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Right. I show it was $10,000, 
but--in the statute going back to 1995, so unless it was very 
recently changed--
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
THE COURT: It says a person convicted of an offense 
9 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
lO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
may be sentenced to pay a fine no~ exceeding Sl0,000 for a 
felony conviction of the first degree or second degree. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Now, is twen--
MR. BUSHELL: Are you reading from the statute? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. BUSHELL: Okay. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yeah. If you could make that change 
on ·that plea agreement on the first page. 
THE COURT: Okay. And then :'11 have you both 
, initial it. 
I show for entities, it's 20,000, so if it was a 
corporation defendant. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Are you incorporated? I think we're-
-you're fine. I don't think you're incorporated. 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: I don't know that. 
THE COURT: Here, I'll hand it back then and let you 
modify that. 
While they're looking at that, on Timothy Lambrose, 
Mr. Bushell, I didn't ask if he wanted to waive the second 
reading of the Information on that case that--
MR. BUSHELL: He would, your Honor. Yes. 
THE COURT: And then enter his not guilty plea on 
that case? 
MR. BUSHELL: Yes. 
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THE COUR?: Okay. Okay. And then back to you, Mr. 
Alex Lambrose, you've inicialed that change then? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. I have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's in your favor, so that's a good 
one. 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: That's good. 
THE COURT: Okay. And then a--a factual basis, Mr. 
Arnold? 
MR. ARNOLD: Yes, Judge. 
On November is:\ 2014, the victim in this case, 
Gabriel Gomez, was listing his 2007 black Cadillac CTS for 
sale. He did that in two different ways, one on KSL and the 
other by listing his number in the back window. 
He received a phone call from a--a male with a phone 
number starting with 385. 
He was then contacted about the vehicle and a--I 
guess a group of individuals showed up at his house to--to 
check out the vehicle. A man exited the--a white Nissan Titan 
and began speaking with Gabriel Gomez about the car, they 
agreed to test drive that car. That man is Alex Lambrose. 
And he--they began a test drive. They drove in and 
around Ogden for some time, up until the point in which Alex 
Lambrose pulled off into a neighborhood, in which he pulled 
the car over off the side of the road and indicated something 
as far as the--the police were fol~owing them. And when the 
11 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
:o 
'' ~-
12 
l3 
14 
7 -
-~ 
i5 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
v:ctim in the case, Gabriel Gomez, turned around, he noL~ced 
the--a white Nissan ~itan that had dropped off Mr. Lambrose at 
h~s house was actually behind them. 
Alex Larnbrose, at that point, unlocked the car doors 
to the Cadillac, being the driver of the vehicle. Gabrie~ 
Gomez turned around and saw who he would identify as his 
brother, ~i~othy Lambrose, exiLing the--the Nissan Titan, 
coming up along the side of the car, getting in the back seat 
of that car and Timothy Lambrose had a knife. Gabriel Gomez 
described that as eight to ten inches :ong and looked like--
looking somewhat like a bayonet. 
At that point, his brother, Timothy Lambrose, gets 
in the back seat of the--of the Cadillac and begins punching 
and speaking with the victim in the case saying, get out, you 
have insura~ce. And ~r. Gomez then tried to pull out his own 
:~:tle pocket k~ife, cut he cou:dr.'t get the blade out to--to 
protect himself. And he was crammed up against the--the front 
part of the Cadillac while Mr. Lambrose, Alex Lambrose was--
was the driver. Ultimately Timothy Lambrose was--was able to, 
you know, force the--the victim out of the car. 
A~d ~hen at that point, he got out of the vehicle, 
A:ex Lambrose sped off with the car and then another person 
who was driving the Nissan Titan followed suit. 
Mr. Go~ez ca:led the police. He then, through 
~etec:ive ~li~~'s investigation here, he spoke with numerous 
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peo9:e 1n regards to ~he case. Mr. Alex Lambrose was 
identified as--as the driver of that vehicle. Mr. Flint 
a~ce~pted to interview Alex La~brose, he invoked his rights to 
remain silent; however, during the course of the 
investigatio~, Detective Flint was also ~onitoring Alex 
Lambrose's jailhouse phone calls and in--one in which he 
states that he played stupid or dumb in regards to the 
Cadillac. 
He also was monitoring his brother's phone calls and 
in which the Cadil:ac is mentioned in--in some of those phone 
ca:ls and so that tipped off Detective Flint as far as the--
where the location of that Cadi:lac was and it was actua~ly 
located at Tim Larebrose, Sr.'s house, the father to Timothy 
Larr.brose and also Alex Larnbrose. 
~nan interview with :i~othy Lambrose, Sr., ~imo~hy 
Lambrose, Sr. indicated that he had asked Alex Lambrose about 
~he Cadi!lac because the boys had--had taken the key and he 
didn't have the key to move a Cadillac and it was blocking his 
garage and he wanted it moved. 
And he went to--and visited Alex at the sa:t ~ake 
County jail and asked him where the key to the Cadillac was 
and according to :imothy Lambrose, Sr.'s interview, Alex said 
that ~he key was in the Nissan Titan. 
And then--~hink of anything else on Aiex? 
MR. AR~lOLD: -:'ha~' s abou ~ it., Judge. 
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C01Jr<.'.:': Okay. Thank yot.:. 
And Mr. Alex Lambrose, do you unders~and that by 
pleading guilty, you would be admitting to thac conduct? 
MR. BOUWHCIS: Your Honor, let ~e just explain 
something on the record just briefly. 
He's--Mr. Lambrose is admitting that he was involved 
in this to the extent necessary to constitute a crime, but the 
description by Mr. Arnold involved other people's actions that 
he's not going to be speaking to. And we recognize the 
Court's not going to ask him to testify, but by asking him to 
verify the statement that was given by Mr. Arnold as the basis 
for the offense, we just want L.O clarify, he's admitting that 
he was involved as described. And that's it. 
~HE COCRT: Okay. Is that correct, Mr. Lambrose? 
MR. ALEX LAfi!BROS~: Yes, yo'Jr Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Are you pleading guilLy then 
because you are guilty of -this crime? 
MR. ALEX I.AMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
7HE COUR?: Okay. Have any other promises been made 
to yo~ in connection with your pleading guilty? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you or forced you 
t.o plead guilty? 
MR. ALEX ~AMBROSE: No, sir. 
~~S COURT: ~o you have any q~est~ons you'd like to 
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ask your att8rney, Mr. Bouwhuis, before_ ask you for you~ 
plea? 
M~. ALEX LAMBROSE: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you feel like you know what 
you're doing? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Alex Lambrose, then, on case 
ending 2453, to Count 1, a first-degree felony, aggravated 
robbery, to that charge, how do you plead? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll accept that guilty plea then 
and I'll find that you have entered into that knowingly, 
voluntarily, intentionally and intelligently. And I'll 
incorporate into those findings the written and verbal 
statements that you've made here today and !'ve just now 
signed your written statement. 
And then is this being referred to AP & P? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And can we do that from here 
then, Laurie, or--
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: Okay. And we're going out, what, about 
six weeks? 
THE CLERK: The 24~h __ 
'!'HE COURT: March 24:n? Okay. March 240:'" at 9: 00. 
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Mr. Arnold, do you k~ow if chere is any resticuLion 
MR. ARNOLD: There wi:: be, Judge. :here's--:'ve 
received a number of statements, the--the vehicle was damaged 
and there--there's a lot of body work that needs co take 
place, t~ne-ups, I believe wheels have been damaged. 
it's--it's--we're talking over $10,000. 
I mean, 
THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Alex Lambrose, then, we'll 
be handing you a document entitled financial declaration. 
need to fil~ that out and hand that in when they come to 
interview you. Okay? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Right. 
THS COUR!: Okay. Anything else then on Mr. Alex 
Larr.brose? 
You 
MR. BOUWHCIS: Le~ ~e just indicate, I had a 
co~versation with Mr. Larr.brose, I will be at the tail end of 
the Love~l case and wi~l not be available. I told him we 
could--we could continue it out probably two weeks, but he's 
indicated to ffie he'd rather proceed as scheduled. 
Is that correct? 
MR. AI..EX LAMBROSE: Yes. (Inaudible) 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, we'll do that--we can do that 
a"C sentencing. 
Just I want to get on the record, there--you're--yo~ 
want to proceed on that date and not burrp it ou~ two weeks for 
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me to be here? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yes. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Or what (inaudible) 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Wel:, I've been your attorney. A 
lot--most clients want the attorney who's been on the case to 
be here for sentencing, but that's--
out two--
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: All right. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Do you want to do that? 
MR. ALEX LAMBROSE: Yeah. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: What we would have to do is bump it 
THE COURT: To April T:.t-: then? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yeah. 
T:iE COURT: Okay .. And will he waive his rj..ght to be 
sentenced within the 45 days then in order to do that? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: He would have to, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. We'll set it for April 7:n 
then at 9:00. 
Are you all right with that, Mr. Arnold?_ 
MR. ARNOLD: That's fine. I'll be here but I--I' 11 
keep my mouth shut on that. 
THE COURT: Oh, you're prohibited from speaking on 
it, aren't you? 
MR. ARNOLD: Yeah. 
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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Alex Lambrose 
~hen. 
Now, the three remaining cases all deal with Mr. 
Timothy Lambrose; right? 
MR. ARNOLD: They do. 
THE COURT: And we're going forward on case ending 
2721 at this time with the preliminary hearing? 
MR. BUSHELL: Correct, your Honor. 
MR. ARNOLD: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. And is the State ready to proceed 
on that? 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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